Abstract I investigate the role played by learning and self-selection according to comparative advantage in the often reported result that piece rate workers (including commissions) earn more on average compared to other workers. With comparative advantage, the returns to skills differ across pay methods. I find that comparative advantage along with learning about worker skills seem to play a role for workers who are either at an early stage in their career or who are observed for the first time in a given job-match. For older workers, the return to skills is basically the same across pay methods.
Introduction
There is a growing body of evidence which shows that "performance pay" workers (piece rate or commission workers) earn more on average compared to salaried or hourly rated workers (see, e.g., Pencavel 1977; Seiler 1984; Brown 1992; Ewing 1996; Lazear 2000; Shearer 2004) . One can think of two main explanations for this relationship between explicit pay-for-performance contracts and the wage structure. On the one hand, it is possible that piece rate workers have stronger incentives to work hard. However, even absent any incentive effects, the self-selection of inherently more productive workers into those jobs will produce a positive correlation between average earnings and the occurrence of pay-for-performance contracts (see Lazear 1986). More productive workers will self-select into those jobs because only for them is it worth it to indirectly pay the (higher) monitoring costs associated with piece rates through reduced wages. Recent papers by Lazear (2000) and Parent (1999) have attempted to control for this selection effect by exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the data sets employed to control for unobserved worker productivity and jobmatch quality. In Lazear's case study, he is able to exploit the fact that the workers' pay method changed from an hourly rate to a piece rate to do a simple before-after comparison in productivity, wages, turnover, and absenteeism. His results show a substantial increase in productivity that is partly the result of selection effects and partly the result of a "pure incentive effect". With a very different data set [the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)], Parent (1999) qualitatively finds the same result in terms of the impact on wages. In both papers, the underlying assumptions are that the return to skills is the same across pay methods and that conditional on the time-invariant unobserved productivity component (as well as on all observables), the choice of pay methods is strictly exogenous. While this rationalizes the use of fixed-effect methods to control for unobserved factors, it may not provide consistent estimates of the true causal (or incentive) effect of explicit contracts in the event that, as implied by comparative advantage, the return to skills does vary with the form of compensation.
The objective in this paper is to determine the extent to which workers do select themselves into jobs offering different methods of compensation based on comparative advantage and on learning about one's skills. This latter aspect is important because it influences both the initial choice of a compensation scheme and the decision to eventually switch pay methods. To empirically study these issues, I make use of the method of moments estimation methodology proposed by Gibbons et al. (2005) in their study of inter-industry and inter-occupation wage differentials in which workers sort themselves across industries and occupations based on comparative advantage and on learning about their initially unobserved skills.
The Lazear (1986) model (see also Brown 1990) predicts that wages should be more sensitive to skills in piece rate jobs. Therefore, assessing the empirical validity of this prediction is of obvious interest. For example, if the return to skills is not very different across pay methods, thus suggesting that comparative advantage considerations may not be all that important, then this may call into question some of the assumptions underlying the theoretical model. Note also that this would validate the use of simple fixed-effect methods. In fact, if selection was completely random, one would not even need to use first-differences: ordinary least squares would suffice to produce an unbiased estimate of the incentive effect. However, researchers routinely use firstdifferences to control for non random selection even though it is not clear that it necessarily follows from an economic model of self-selection.
In a related vein, Prendergast (2000) notes that explicit incentive contracts tend to be found in environments with often large random fluctuations, such as sales. This observation seems at odds with the notion that incentives are offered in less risky environment, as the basic principal-agent model would suggest, yet is consistent with the fact that the empirical evidence on the trade-off between risks and incentives is somewhat controversial, some authors finding support for the predicted trade-off (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick 1999) while others do not (Garen 1994) . Prendergast then notes that in relatively stable or less risky environments, firms may intensify
